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We set up a model to investigate corporate income tax evasion. The main difference 
between individual tax evasion and corporate tax evasion is that the owners and the 
managers of a corporation are usually separate from each other, thus they need to 
cooperate when deciding to evade, which suggests that corporate tax evasion is a kind 
of principal-agent problem. Managers need to be given enough incentive to evade 
through a compensation package depending on the firm’s after-tax profit rather than 
before-tax profit. We find that the optimal compensation scheme has to be altered 
under evasion, which means an evading firm bears an extra cost of efficiency loss in 
corporate governance in addition to the cost of being detected and penalized 
compared to an individual, which we believe is an important factor in a firm’s 
decision making process and for explaining the great difference in observed data.
1. Introduction 
There is a long history of taxation. Since there existed the concept of nation, there was 
also the concept of taxation. Taxation is the important way a government earns 
incomes. It seems that paying taxes is a citizen’s inherent obligation, while imposing 
taxes is a government’s natural right. There is a long history of tax evasion as well. 
Since there was taxation, there was tax evasion. Although some people voluntarily 
pay their taxes no matter due to their strong sense of responsibility or the fear that not 
paying is illegal, most people are not willing to pay out part of what they earn and 
seeking the opportunity to shirk their tax liability, especially observing that some 
people are not being punished for evading taxes. Therefore, governments can not 
merely announce a tax system and expect to collect all the taxes they have planed to 
raise. Tax authorities have to make effort to monitor and administer taxation, which is 
not costless. Thus, it is beneficial to investigate the characteristics and determinants of 
tax evasion, so that governments are able to improve their tax systems and enhance 
the enforcement of taxation. 
First of all, it is necessary to determine the extent of tax evasion; however, it is 
difficult to measure because of its illegal nature. On one hand, no one will tell that her 
actual income is larger than what she reports to be subject to taxation when filling a 
questionnaire for research. On the other hand, the complexity of the law and the tax 
system itself makes it ambiguous when determining whether an activity is illegal tax 
evasion or legally permissible tax avoidance. The most credible source of information 
about the extent of tax evasion comes from two programs conducted by the U.S. 
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Internal Revenue Service. The Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program, done 
from 1963 until 1988, was a program of intensive audits on a certain group of 
taxpayers, combining with the information obtained from other studies about 
particular sources of income, based on which, the IRS estimated the “tax gap”. Later, 
the program stopped for complaints that such research was unfair; until recently, a 
modified version, the National Research Program was implemented to analyze tax 
returns from the 2001 tax year. After more than ten years, the IRS released their 
estimates of tax underreporting gap for 2001. 
In the IRS’s report, the aggregate tax underreporting gap was broken down into 
individual income tax, employment tax, corporate income tax etc. Looking into the 
data provided in Slemrod (2007), there are some interesting findings. Individual 
income tax is further divided into underreported non-business income and 
underreported business income. Non-business income is underreported by only 4 
percent, while the underreporting rate of business income is much higher at 43 percent. 
This is probably resulted from the fact that non-business income, such as wages and 
salaries, or interest and dividends are reported by the employers or the firms who pay 
them. There is less incentive for the reporters to hide the real information for those 
who receive the money. However, the individual business income is under everyone’s 
own control. Thus, the 43 percent basically reflects the extent of individual tax 
evasion. This considerably higher rate is also associated with the high underreporting 
rate of self-employment tax, which is estimated as 52 percent. For corporate income 
tax, firms are classified into large ones and small ones based on their assets. Large 
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corporations underreport about 14 percent of their incomes, while the rate of small 
corporations is slightly more than twice (29 percent); both are lower than that of 
individual income tax. 
Observing these data, we would like to raise several questions: why there is such 
great difference in the underreporting rate among individual business income, small 
corporations and large corporations? How tax evasion decisions are made and what is 
the distinction between individual income tax and corporate income tax? 
Intuitively, there are two possible explanations for the reality. One is that the 
extent of penalty may be different between individuals and corporations; the other is 
that the extent of auditing may also not be the same. The penalty varies from country 
to country. In most countries, it is mainly in the form of a fine payment, but for severe 
cases, the evaders may be given criminal conviction. For a company, normally it is the 
legal person and the finance manager who take responsibility for the evasion. But 
within a certain country, if it is stipulated that people involving in severe cases or 
repeated cases should be put into jail, usually it applies to both individuals and 
managements of a company. The other explanation is different auditing frequency. A 
corporation’s profit exceeds a person’s income a lot, so a same or even a lower 
underreporting rate of corporations perhaps means a much larger quantity which may 
cause the tax authority to take more investigation, thus making the large corporations 
harder to evade compared to individuals. Perceived this fact, some papers considered 
the case under a varying auditing frequency which is related to the reported amount. 
However in our work, we would like to show a third possible answer, thus we will 
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assume there is no distinction in these two factors. We assume a same punishment for 
individual tax evasion and corporate tax evasion; besides we treat the possible legal 
penalty and reputation loss as in the monetary term. We assume a detection 
probability which is independent of the reported taxable income. In another word, an 
identical tax system is supposed for these two kinds of tax evasion, but it will be 
shown that corporations still exhibit lower underreporting tendency. We believe it 
results from the organization form of modern corporations. Furthermore, it gives some 
vague edification: unlike what we usually think, it seems that corporations do not 
need monitoring as much as individuals do. 
Beginning with the classic article of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), researches on 
individual tax evasion developed a lot; however, although corporations play a central 
role in the tax system, corporate tax evasion has not gain much attention. Most studies 
on corporate tax evasion are not separate from those of individual ones in the 
fundamental concept: there is just one individual who decides whether and how much 
to evade. This is true for private business, where the owner runs the business herself, 
including managing the tax reporting issues. However, it does not work in the exact 
same way for public corporations. In public-held corporations, owners and managers 
are usually apart from each other. Owners benefit from tax evasion by retaining a 
higher after-tax profit, so that they have an incentive to evade tax as long as the 
expected utility exceeds that of truthfully reporting. But a key point is that owners 
generally do not report themselves, in stead, they have managers of the firm to make 
these arrangements for them. Therefore, corporate tax evasion is not purely a problem 
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for one individual, but rather a more complicated issue which involves the interaction 
between firm owners and their managers. Managers usually do not have the same 
incentive as owners. Tax evasion will not benefit managers if managers are 
compensated according to firm’s before-tax profitability. Furthermore, managers may 
not be willing to participate in evasion since evasion is illegal, which might induce 
penalty on them. Hence, if a firm determines to evade tax, it should firstly give 
managers enough incentive to participate in this activity; in another word, firms 
should compensate managers for bearing the risk of tax evasion. This suggests that 
corporate tax evasion should be analyzed under a principal-agent framework, which 
seeks to find ways to align managers’ incentives with firm owners’. 
The first theoretical model of corporate tax evasion is proposed in Chen and Chu 
(2005). They argued that the nature of illegality of evasion produces the 
incompleteness of the compensation contract, which will distort the effort of the 
manager and cause internal efficiency loss. We doubt that the contract designed in 
Chen and Chu’s paper is not workable in reality, so in this paper, we make some twists 
to their model. We will introduce their designation later, but in our model, we just use 
a common simple contract, incorporating a “stock portion”, which tries to capture the 
after-tax profitability so that the manager is rewarded not only for her effort in 
managing the firm’s operations but also for the risk in participating in the evasion. 
There is similar result as found in Chen and Chu: in the presence of tax evasion, 
compensation contract must be changed from the second-best compensation scheme, 
which will induce efficiency loss. The argument implies that firms have two sources 
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of costs when evading tax. One is the risk of being caught, which is also considered in 
analyzing individual income tax evasion. The other one is the efficiency loss, which 
we believe is the critical factor in corporate tax evasion. It can be used to explain what 
is found from the empirical data. Because of one more consideration of tradeoffs, 
firms exhibit a much lower underreporting rate compared to individuals. An 
individual will evade taxes if the expected profit is higher from evasion than that from 
honest reporting. A corporation will evade only when the expected profit is higher 
enough to cover the internal efficiency loss. 
We offer two models. The first one is a simple model where we assume the firm 
owner can observe the true profit produced by the manager. The owner has two 
choices, ordering the manager to truthfully report or allowing her to underreport. We 
will show later that whenever the owner allows evasion, the manager will always 
choose to evade. This assumption is made to eliminate the possibility for the manager 
to overstate her performance. However, this kind of events does happen in the real 
world. Owners usually do not know the sound status of their firms just like the tax 
authority. They obtain the information by examining the financial statements prepared 
by the managers, facing a problem that the managers might have the incentive to 
over-report the profit so that they can earn a higher salary. Thus, in the second model, 
we loosen the restriction: the owner cannot observe the true profit any more. She has 
to design some certain compensation contracts to induce the manager to underreport, 
truthfully report or over-report. We will show that this fact brings more efficiency loss 
to the firm when tax evasion is a consideration. 
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The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a 
literature review of tax evasion, focusing on corporate income tax evasion. In section 
3 we set up the model. We will first discuss Chen and Chu’s model, and then explain 
why we need to change the assumptions and what our model looks like. Section 4 
presents the findings. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
The theoretical model of tax evasion was first provided by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972). In that paper, the authors analyzed how a risk-averse individual make decision 
on whether and how much to evade taxes. Since underreporting will not necessarily 
be detected, tax declaration decision is like gambling. Evasion may give the taxpayer 
a higher pay-off, but it’s at the risk of being caught and penalized, thus being worse 
off. Rational individual chooses how much to evade to maximize her expected utility. 
The paper showed that optimal tax evasion level depends on the degree of risk 
aversion, applied tax rate, penalty rate and the chance of getting caught. 
This simple model has been extended in the following years in different 
dimensions. One is to incorporate labor supply decision so that income is no longer 
exogenously given, which brings interaction between labor supply decision and tax 
evasion decision. Another aspect is to consider repeated games between taxpayers and 
tax authorities, as people will update their knowledge and adjust their decisions with 
previous experiences. Besides, there are researches on analyzing the situation that the 
probability of audit is a function of reported income other than a constant rate. Some 
other economists take into account the influence of people’s moral sense and the 
fairness of the tax system. (Andreoni et al, 1998; Sandmo 2005) 
While there are a number of papers addressing individual tax evasion following 
Allingham and Sandmo, the study regarding corporate tax evasion is much less. Most 
of the models assume that the owner of the firm makes decision on profit declaration. 
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Although the issue discussed is about business tax evasion, it is actually similar to that 
of individuals. It is still a portfolio-selection problem, in which decision maker selects 
the optimal level of the risky asset (evaded income which saves tax but induces 
possible penalty). The main difference is that with the presence of tax evasion, the 
choice of production might also be affected by tax rate, penalty size and auditing 
frequency. Marrelli and Martina (1988) analyzed an oligopolistic market and showed 
that optimal amount of tax evasion depends on the collusiveness as well as the relative 
market shares. Virmani (1989) considered a more general case of a perfect 
competitive market and concluded that tax evasion may lead to inefficient production 
and thus imposing costs on the economy. A series of papers focused on the 
relationship between these two decisions of a monopolist. Kreutzer and Lee (1986) 
explored how profit tax can reduce monopoly distortion since successful tax evasion 
will have an effect on the output level which maximizes the firm’s after-tax profit. 
They showed that the overstatement of production costs induces the firms to increase 
output. This opinion challenged the generally held point of view that profit tax is 
neutral, i.e. it does not influence a monopolist’s profit maximizing level of output. 
Wang and Conant (1988) derived a contrary result to them that the monopolist’s 
optimal level of output is separate from the tax evasion decision, which reinforced the 
conventional view. However, in Wang (1990), by endogenizing the probability of 
detection and the penalty rate, it was concluded that the separability between the two 
decisions no longer holds and the tax-evading monopolist may restrict output, even 
worsening monopoly distortion. Further discussions can be found in Yaniv (1996), 
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Lee (1998), Panteghini (2000), Goerke and Runkel (2005).  
However, the assumption that when choosing to underreport the profit, a firm acts 
in the same way as an individual does is only reasonable with those small-sized and 
privately-held firms. In large public companies, tax reporting decision, like most 
producing or investment decisions, is usually made by CFO or the vice-president who 
is in charge of tax affairs in stead of being directly determined by the owners. Because 
of the separation between ownership and management, the problem of corporate tax 
evasion is more complicated than individual ones. Slemrod (2004; 2005; 2007) 
pointed out that corporate tax evasion should be analyzed under a principal-agent 
framework – “to align the incentives of the decision makers and the shareholders, the 
corporation should tie the agent’s compensation to observable outcomes that affect 
after-tax corporate profitability” (2007). 
There is paper investigating how manager’s own preference in evasion influence 
her decision for the firm, e.g. in David Joulfaian (2000), but it is not the relationship 
we are going to talk about. One of the earliest theoretical models to analyze the 
problem in a principal-agent way was provided by Chen and Chu (2005), which is 
also the fundamental model this paper relied on. The authors considered a game 
between a risk-neutral principal (owner of the firm) and a risk-averse agent (manager). 
They indicated that tax evasion is illegal and a contract based on illegal actions is not 
enforceable. Manager bears the risk of being caught and punished, so the contract 
should be able to compensate the manager not only her effort but also her risk in order 
to induce her to participate in evasion, i.e. a higher wage when evasion is detected and 
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penalized. Besides, knowing that the contract will not be honored by the court if 
evasion is detected, the risk needs to be compensated ex ante, which leads to the 
incompleteness of the contract in the sense that the manager’s pay is not contingent on 
whether evasion is detected or not. This failure in efficiently sharing the risk of 
evasion by the owners and the manager creates distortion in the manager’s incentive 
in exerting efforts. Their model implies that in addition to the tradeoff between 
expected gain in evasion and the risk of getting caught, there is another tradeoff 
between expected gain and efficiency loss for corporations. Therefore, even if the 
expected gain from evasion less the expected penalty is positive, a firm will not 
necessarily evade as efficiency loss might be extremely high. The authors also 
discussed other potential reasons that can incur internal inefficiency when evasion 
exists, e.g. agent’s extortion and repeated interaction. 
Crocker and Slemrod (2005) examined this issue by considering a contractual 
relationship between the shareholders of a firm and the CFO it hires. Under their 
assumptions, the before-tax income of the firm is exogenously given (not depending 
on the CFO’s effort). The CFO’s private information here is the extent of the legally 
permissible tax reductions x, which the shareholders only have the idea of the 
distribution density. Besides, the actual reduction in taxable income R is known to the 
shareholders. Thus, there exists tax evasion of )( xR − which might be penalized upon 
detecting. The main results found are: tax evasion will be reduced when penalties – no 
matter levied on the firm or the CFO – increase; however, the penalty imposed on 
CFO directly is more effective in reducing tax evasion, which provides guidance for 
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tax authorities in their enforcement policies. 
In Desai et al (2003), the authors investigated the interaction between corporate 
taxes and corporate governance using a different approach. They considered a game 
involving tax authorities, inside shareholders who have the ability to divert corporate 
value, and outside shareholders. Since attempting to avoid tax makes a firm’s 
financial state opaque to outside investors, it becomes harder for outsiders to control 
insiders. Thus, tax evasion will worsen the corporate governance. It is shown that 
higher tax rate will worsen corporate governance as it increases the return of diverting 
by insiders, thus providing more incentive for insiders to divert. On the contrary, 
increase in tax enforcement helps to increase the difficulty of the insiders in diverting 
corporate value into their own pockets, which favors the interest of outside 
shareholders, and increases the market value of the firm, although the tax payment is 
higher under this situation. 
Later on, in Desai and Dharmapala (2006), the authors introduced the 
principal-agent framework into the analysis. They argued that decisions about tax 
evasion and rent diversion are interdependent on each other. Incentive compensation 
aims to align the incentive of agents with the interests of the principals so that it 
should induce the reduction in rent diversion and the increase in tax avoidance. Thus, 
higher-powered incentive compensations should lead to more tax evasion. However, 




3. The model 
 
3.1 Chen and Chu’s model 
 
Before introducing our model, we discuss Chen and Chu’s first. In their paper, a 
standard principal-agent model where a risk-neutral principal hires a risk-averse agent 
is presented. The manager exerts a certain level of effort e and then the firm will 
realize a profit y with a density function of the realization of y, )( eyf ; it is assumed 
that )( eyf first-order stochastically dominates )'( eyf if , which means more 
efforts results in higher expected profit. The profit y is verifiable and observable to 
both parties while effort level is the private information of the manager
'ee >
1. In the first 
stage, the owner and the manager sign a contract of the compensation for the 
manager, , which depends on the realized profit y. In the second stage, the 
manager chooses an effort level to maximize her utility. The owner designs the 
compensation contract in the first stage by solving the manager’s optimization 
problem in the second stage, in order to maximize her after-tax profit. This is the 
well-known method to give the manager enough incentive so as to work in the interest 
of the owners.  
)( yw
However, if the owner intends to evade part of the firm’s true profit, the situation 
becomes complicated. Given that tax evasion is illegal, the authors argued that the 
previous contract will no longer be supported by the court and thus no longer 
enforceable. Therefore, the manager has no incentive to evade tax since her 
                                                        
1 These are standard assumptions in principal-agent analysis developed by B. Holmsdrom (1979). 
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compensation will depend on the reported profit r rather than the true profit y. This is 
because on one hand is less than when evasion is profitable and successful, 
while on the other hand if the owner refuses to pay according to y, the court won’t 
enforce her to do that as officially the firm’s profit is r, so that rational owner will 




2. Knowing this, the manager will not be willing to help 
the owner to underreport profit. Chen and Chu argued that the owner has to alter her 
contract to induce the manager to do that. The new contract consists of two parts: a 
wage contract depending on the reported profit r and a so-called “service” 
contract which is . In the first stage, the owner designs the contract and 
the manager accepts it. In the second stage, the manager selects an effort level and a 
certain profit y is realized. Observing this profit y, the owner chooses how much the 
manager should report to the tax authority, r. This underreporting activity is seemed as 
an extra “service” provided by the manager. Whenever she acts in this way, she will 
get in return. It was argued that this contract is enforceable because 
officially reporting r means that the manager does provide the service and deserves 






3. With this new contract, the 
                                                        
2 By “officially the firm’s profit is r” it means that since the company reports its profit to the tax authority as r, the 
court will just take r as what the manager produces and according to which she can claim her compensation. The 
true profit y is verifiable and observable to both the owners and the manager, but not to the public without any 
investigation, otherwise the tax authority will always be able to obtain the real information and no evasion is 
possible to exist. Furthermore, here it is assumed that only the tax authority will take investigation into whether the 
profit is underreported, while the court’s work is just to enforce the contract. We will discuss this later. 
3 Again, whether r is real profit or not is not the court’s concern. The problem for the court is to rule on how much 
should be paid to the manager by the company according to their contract, taken r reported on the financial 
statement published as true profit the manager produces. Therefore, under the former contract form, only w(r) 
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manager will be compensated )()]()([)( ywrwywrw =−+ if she evades according to 
the owner’s order, which is the same as being paid just if she dose not follow the 
owner, but rather truthfully reporting the profit, so that the manager is indifferent 




actually the manager is paid according to the true profit y in this case, evasion 
decision does not affect the optimal compensation contract and optimal effort level5.  
Furthermore, there is potential penalty on the manager. Suppose that the manager 
will be penalized by 6( ryx −
)( y
if evasion is detected, so that paying is still not 
enough for the manager to participate in evasion; she needs to be compensated more 
for the risk. Again, this compensation should be made in the same way as the service 
contract does for the same reason. Thus, the contract becomes 
{ ;
)( yw
)(rw )()( rwyw π+− }, where )( yπ is the risk premium. In order to induce the 
manager to participate in evasion, this should satisfy that the manager will be )( yπ
                                                                                                                                                               
needed to be paid, while under the latter form, in addition to w(r), the “service payment” should also be paid. 
4 Here the potential penalty to the manager is not considered. It will be explained in the next paragraph. This is for 
the purpose of showing that even the manager is determined by law not liable for evasion, though it rarely happens, 
the compensation contract has to be in a special form. The decision of evading in case of indifference is to ensure 
the analysis to be meaningful. However, it sounds unreasonable. We suggest one possible explanation for why the 
manager will choose to take the illegal activity: firstly, the compensation is the same, there is no loss for the 
manager to perform illegally since it is assumed in this case that she can distinct herself from evasion; secondly, if 
she does not obey the owners, she might lose her job in the future. 
5 On one hand, the manager’s optimization problem is not changed. On the other hand, it is showed that the 
optimal level of evasion is independent of the real profit, thus the difference of the owner’s problem between 
evasion case and no evasion is just an additional constant term, which will not affect the solutions. 
6 x is a function of (y-r), which means the penalty depends on the size of the evasion. We will explain the detailed 
requirements x function should satisfy later in our model. 
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indifferent between receiving for sure, i.e. reporting truthfully, and evading with 
the risk of being caught. Suppose that there exists a probability of p to be audited by 
tax authority and once audited, evasion will be certainly detected, 
)( yw
)( yπ will be like 
that to ensure the following equation hold: 
)]([)]()()([)1()]()()()([ ywurwywrwupryrwywrwpu =() y+() yx+−+ − −+−+−π
where is the agent’s utility function. )(⋅u
π
 
3.2 Our concerns 
 
Nevertheless, we doubt whether the above-stated contract is workable in reality. A key 
point for the contract to properly work is that the service contract will be supported by 
the court, which guarantees the manager to be compensated no worse under evasion. 
Chen and Chu ague that generally the court will only look into whether the manager 
fulfills the requirements in the contract when being asked to enforce the service 
contract, but will not check whether that r is true profit, so tax evasion will not be 
uncovered because of this contract form. This argument promises the feasibility of the 
contract proposed. However, we do believe that in the real world, the separation of 
wage contract and service contract implies that there is manipulation in the profit 
report, thus must lead the court to suspect and take investigation into the corporation. 
With investigations, tax evasion will be found; because it is illegal, on one hand, the 
legitimacy of the contract no longer exists, which means that the manager can no 
longer expect to get the “service payment” through it, on the other hand, there is extra 
penalty waiting for her, which tells that this kind of contract apparently cannot give 
16 
 
the manager enough protection that it intends to provide. Knowing all these, the 
manager is better not to participate in the tax evasion. To solve the problem, we 
abandon this kind of contract and make some more reasonable assumptions in our 
models. 
We consider a usual contract, which states that manager should be compensated 
according to the reported profit r. r is verifiable and observable to both parties in both 
models. But as explained before, when taking tax into consideration, the manager 
needs to be compensated according to after-tax profit in order to induce evasion - this 
can be realized through a fraction of “stocks”. Assume that after-tax profit is 
completely reflected in the dividends paid and/or in the appreciation of the stock price. 
In another word, by given the stock part, the manager possesses a proportion of 
after-tax profit as a component of total compensation. Finally, the manager is 
compensated a wage part and a stock part. There is some difference between the wage 
here and that used in the standard principal-agent model, i.e. the wage is based on 
how much profit reported instead of how much actually produced. Also, there is some 
difference in the meaning of the stock part. We consider only one factor which 
influences the value of the stocks, i.e. the after-tax profit, and we directly treat the 
increase in the value of the stocks as the manager’s income. This is to let any potential 
losses and risks related to tax evasion be compensated by the stocks given to the 
manager. Moreover, let the manager to decide whether and how much to evade. There 
is a trade off for the manager between receiving higher wages but lower gain in stocks 
with reporting more and receiving fewer wages but more income from stocks with 
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evading more. A rational manager will choose to balance the tradeoff, and because the 
choice is made by the manager herself, there is no conflict between the owner and the 
manager. No matter whether to evade or not, how much to evade, it is an outcome 
maximizing both the manager’s utility and the owner’s utility. 
We are aiming to check how evasion decision brings efficiency loss, so we only 
focus on the situations where the firm earns a positive profit, i.e. the firm should pay 
some tax according to law. If the firm loses within a certain time horizon, no income 
tax needs to be paid, thus no tax evasion decision. In another word, we suppose a 
prerequisite that the true taxable income is greater than zero. 
For simplicity, we assume linear contracts in both models. Manager will get a 
salary linear in the reported profit and a proportion of stocks. In model 1, we assume 
the principal can observe true before-tax profit, so that any over-report will be 
prevented. In model 2, we loosen the assumptions: the owner does not observe the 
exact true before-tax profit, providing the chance of over-report to the manager. 
Because in model 1, over-report will not happen, to make the problem simple, we just 
assume a fixed wage part plus stocks; while in model 2, a general wage function that 
consists of a fixed part and a part increasing in the reported profit is considered. There 
is a tradeoff for the manager: reporting higher profit means higher wage but lower 
income as a shareholder; reporting lower profit means less wage but more earnings in 




3.3 Model 1 
 
Suppose that before-tax profit the firm can generate depends on the manager’s effort. 
Thus, higher effort means higher expected wage as well as more disutility caused by 
working harder. Besides, the manager’s earnings are also affected by her tax reporting 
strategy if the firm allows evasion because evasion may leave the firm with more 
after-tax income, benefiting shareholders, including the manager. 
The firm owner is assumed to be risk-neutral, while the manager exhibits constant 
absolute risk-averse preferences. Let her utility be expressed by the following 
exponential function: 
)]([),( aweawu ψη −−−=  
where w is the total monetary compensation. 0>η  is the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion, and )(aψ  is a measure of the effort cost, a for effort level. Let the effort 
cost function to be quadratic as 2
2
1)( caa =ψ . 
Suppose the owners and the manager sign a linear contract in the following form: 
))(1( bytsbw −−+=  
where b is the fixed salary the manager will be paid and y is the realized before-tax 
profit (revenue subtracting all the costs other than the manager’s salary). Thus, 
is subject to be taxed)( by − 7. )1,0(∈s  is the proportion of stocks given to the 
                                                        
7  b should be small relative to y, however, it is a choice variable of the owners in the issue we are discussing, 
which strictly speaking, affects the before-tax profit. We cannot treat it as the same as other costs, because all the 
other costs, such as costs of raw materials, operation costs and other employees’ payroll etc, are determined by the 
manager as a result of her effort in running the company, while b is out of the manager’s control. The ultimate 
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manager.  is the applied tax rate. )1,0(∈t
Further assume that the before-tax profit is equal to manager’s effort level plus a 
noise term: 
ε+= ay , where 8),0(~ 2σε N . But remember that our discussion is restricted 
within the region of a positive profit. 
 
3.3.1 No evasion case 
 
The principal maximizes her utility by choosing the fixed salary b and the stock 
proportion s. Meanwhile, through the compensation contract, she indirectly chooses 
an optimal effort level. Thus, although effort is the manager’s decision, we include it 










1))(1( bytsb −−−+[ 2
wueE
ca ≥− −η                                      (IR) 
and 




−−−+−∈ η                                  (IC) 
)(wu  is the reservation utility level of the manager and w  denotes the where 
                                                                                                                                                               
before-tax profit actually is (y-b), where y is the result of manager’s behavior, while b is the result of owners’ 
behavior, which should be separated. The impact on before-tax profit produced by b cannot be included in y, thus b 
should not be eliminated from the expression of taxable profit even though it is relatively small to y.  
8  All the assumptions follow the model in Contract Theory, Chapter 4: Hidden action, moral Hazard. (Bolton, 
Patrick and Dewatripont, Mathias, c2005). 
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minimum acceptable monetary equivalent of the manager’s compensation contract. 
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The first order condition is 
c
tsacats )1(0)1( −=⇒=−−  
This is how much effort the manager will exert for any given incentive s. 
                                                        
9 See Contract Theory, Chapter 4: Hidden action, moral Hazard. (Bolton, Patrick and Dewatripont, Mathias, 
c2005). When a random variableε is normally distributed with zero mean and variance , we have 
for any
2σ

































































 is the area under a normal distribution with mean and variance , 


































tsb +−−−−−−= ση  
Substitute it into the objective function and differentiate with respect to s, we 

















st ησ (1) 
Denote the solution to equation (1) as , and substitute it into the expression of b 
and get . We call  the second-best compensation scheme. 
os
ob ),( oo sb
 

















































































−= ησησ  








 is positive. Let 
ttwctcstcA −++−−+= 2]1)1)[(1( 232 ησησ , A is monotonically increasing in s. 
22)1)(1()0( 2 −+−−== twcctsA ησ  
]12)1[()1( 222 −−+−== twccttsA ησ  
If , i.e. 0)0( ≥=sA 022)1)(1( 2 ≥−+−− twcct ησ ,  for all . If 
, 
0>A )1,0(∈s
0>A g  is increasing in s. Since )0( =sg  is positive, there is no solution for 
equation (1). 
If , i.e. 0)1( ≤=sA 012)1( 222 ≤−−+− twcct ησ , 0<A  for all . If 
, 
)1,0(∈s
0<A g  is decreasing in s. When 0)1( >=sg , i.e. 012 >−+tw22 + cησ)1( 2− ct , 
there is no solution. When 0)1( ≤=sg , i.e. 01≤−22 +ησ) 22 +− twcct1( , there 
exists one solution. 
If , i.e. 0)1(,0)0( >=<= sAsA
 012)1(,022)1)(1( 2222 >−−+−<−+−− ttwccttwcct ησησ , g  is firstly 

















. Thus, if the value of g  at this point is positive, there is 
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; if the value is negative, there are two solutions for 
equation (1), however, we need to take second-order condition into consideration as 
well: A is negative at the smaller point so that (S.O.C) is negative, which means it 
gives maximum value, while at the larger point, is positive, meaning it is a 
solution for minimum value, which should be omitted. 
sg
sg
To sum up, there is one solution for equation (1) if one of the following conditions 
is satisfied: i). 012)1( 222 <−++− twcct ησ ;  
ii). 022)1)(1( 2 <−+−− twcct ησ , 012)1( 22 >−−− ttwcct 2 +ησ , and the value of 


















3.3.2 Evasion case 
 
If the firm allows evading, they have to solve a different problem and may offer a 
different contract. After a certain before-tax profit y is realized and observed by both 
parties, the manager might choose any yr ≤ to report as the firm’s taxable income. 
Assume tax authority conducts an investigation on all the firms with a probability 
of p, which is between zero and one; whenever an evading firm is investigated, it will 
be uncovered for certain. If an evading firm is detected, it has to pay the full tax plus a 
penalty; furthermore, the manager will be punished an extra amount of money. 
Suppose the penalty follows a convex function, which means that the penalty will 
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become severer with the increase in the extent of evasion. For simplicity, we assume 
the penalty function for the firm to be and for the manager to be 
, where . When there is no evasion, both penalties are equal 
to zero. 
2)( ryx −
2)( ryq − 0,0 >> qx
The expected compensation the manager can earn for producing a profit y and 
reporting r , less than or equal to y, to the tax authority is 
)]([)1())(])())(1[(()( 22 brtbyspryqryxbytspbwE −−−−+−−−−−−+=
)( br
where b is the fixed salary no matter tax evasion is detected or not; if with probability 
p, evasion is detected, the after-tax profit left to all the shareholders will be less, and 
additionally the manager will be punished on the personal level; if the firm is lucky 
enough, only −  is taxed, which results in more income from stocks. The 
manager will choose an r to maximize the above expected compensation. Here we 
assume r can be less than zero, meaning that there is situation of reporting a loss. For 
simplicity, we further assume that if a firm reports loss, it will get some tax payback 
or tax exemption in next period from the tax authority, which is equivalent to the 
product of the amount of loss and the tax rate. Anyway, with this assumption, we 











Since parameters p, s, t, x, q are all greater than zero, and p is less than one, 
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)( ry − is a positive constant, which means that whenever evasion is allowed, the 
manager will always select underreporting. Moreover, she will always underreport a 
fixed amount regardless of how much true profit is for any fixed auditing rate, tax rate, 
penalty intensity, and the incentive strength. It is easy to find that r is increasing in 
auditing frequency and penalty rate on the level of firm as well as on the manager, the 
economic explanation of which is quite straightforward. r is decreasing in tax rate and 
incentive factor because under a higher tax rate, evasion helps to save more taxes, 
thus it is beneficial for the manager to practice more evasion, and a higher proportion 
of stocks means more weight of the total compensation on the after-tax profit, 
providing a higher incentive for the manager to evade. In a word, the manager’s 
expected compensation if evasion is allowed by the owner equals to 
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We follow the similar steps as in the no evasion case and simplify the manager’s 
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The first order condition is 
c
tsacats )1(0)1( −=⇒=−−  
which is identical as that in no evasion case. 
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Denote the solution to equation (2) as , and substitute it into the expression of b 
and get .  is the best contract for the owner if she allows evasion. 
∗s
∗b ),( ∗∗ sb
As we have already shown before, the manager’s expected compensation if the 



































−+−= ση . 
Recall that if evasion is not permissible, the manager’s compensation is 












o +−−−−−−= ση . 
We also find that the optimal effort level is in the same function of s, which means 
that whenever  and  are equal, the effort level will be the same under evasion 









































      wbtssyts =+−+−= oooo )1()1(
This means that if , the optimal contract under the evasion case provides the 
same expected total compensation as the second-best compensation scheme in no 
evasion case does, thus no efficiency loss is associated with evasion. 
oss =∗
Now we need to check whether  will be equal to . Compare equation (1) 
with equation (2), there is one more term containing s in the second equation, while 
all else are just identical, suggesting that only under some strict conditions, the 
solution will be the same, but in most situations, they are different from each other. 
We will discuss this in detail later in section 4. 
∗s os
 
3.4 Model 2 
 
In model 2, it is assumed that the principal cannot observe true profit generated by the 
manager. She faces the possibility that the manager may exaggerate her performance 
29 
 
in order to earn more bonuses. The contract consists of three parts: a fixed salary b, a 
part related to reported profit (for simplicity, it is assumed to be linear as mentioned 
before), and a stock proportion: 
))(1( mrbytnmrbw −−−++= 10 
where m is the parameter for bonus and n is the stock fraction. The first two terms are 
paid as wage, thus are subtracted when calculating the taxable income, while the last 
term is a measure of the compensation as being a shareholder. All other assumptions 
are the same as in model 1. 
The manager has three strategies: report yr < ; report yr = ; report yr > . 
The choice is made after true profit y is realized. We show the expected total 
compensation under these situations. 
 
3.4.1 To underreport 
 








Substitute yr = into the above expression 
))(1()( mybytnmybwE −−−++= , 
which is the compensation for truthfully reporting, meaning that the expression is 
applicable for any yr ≤ . 
First order condition is 
                                                        








Notice that it is a constant for any settled tax system and designed contract, but it 
is no longer always positive as in model 1. 
When it is positive, i.e. 0)1()1( >+−−− mntnntp , the manager will choose to 







 regardless of the level of y. In this case, 
reported profit r is increasing in p, x, q, m, and decreasing in t and n. The explanations 
are the same as in model 1. For m, it means that when the bonus part accounts more in 
the total compensation relative to the stock part, the manager is less willing to 
increase the value of stocks by giving up what she can earn as bonuses, thus she will 
report more. 
When it is zero, i.e. 0)1()1( =+−−− mntnntp , the manager’s best choice is to 
report yr = . 
When it is negative, i.e. 0)1()1( <+−−− mntnntp
y
, the first order condition 
indicates that the manager’s best choice is to report an r greater than y. However, we 
have limited r to be less than or equal to y in this situation, so the solution should be 
the corner solution that r = . 
 
3.4.2 To over-report 
 
When the manager chooses to over-report, the firm has to pay more taxes, but there is 
no penalty if the over-reporting is found, also there is no refund for the over-paid 


















which means this expression is also applicable to yr = . 
When the coefficient of r is positive, i.e. 0)1()1( >−−− mntnm
)(wE
, the manager 
should choose r as high as possible to maximize . There is an important point 
here that when over-reporting, the manager has to make sure that the firm is able to 
afford the taxes it declares, i.e. taxes to be paid should not exceed the realized true 











−−=  in such a situation. When the 
true taxable income is positive, which is assumed in the very beginning of our 
analysis, this r is greater than y, meaning that it does satisfy the constraint for this 
situation. We show the proof as follows. 
Suppose that the true taxable income is positive, we have 
bymmyby >−⇒>−− )1(0  
             btytm )1()1)(1( −>−−⇒  
             btytmtyy )1()1( −>−−−⇒  
             ymtmbty ))1(()1( −+>−−⇒  









When the coefficient is negative, the manager should report r as low as possible, 
that is just y in this situation. 
When the coefficient is zero, reporting anything possible results in a same 
outcome; we assume that if this is the case, the manager will just honestly report y. 
To sum up, the manager’s strategy for how to report the profits depends on the 






























,     if 
ntn
ntm +−> 1 . 












if the manager underreports; 
))(1)(1( mybytn −−−− , if the manager truthfully reports; 
0, if the manager over-reports. 
Obviously, the owner wants to avoid over-reporting since she will get nothing in 
the end; furthermore, for any fixed combination of m and n, the payoff from 








s positive. Thus, whenever possible, the owner prefers underreporting; in order to 
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Denote the solution as . ),,( ooo nmb
If it turns out that the evasion will happen and the manager chooses the optimal 
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Denote the solution as . 
ethods used in model 1, we can derive that for both cases, the 
optim
),,( ∗∗∗ nmb
Follow the same m
al level is in the same function of m and n, which is 
c
mtnma )1)(1( −−+= . 
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The first order conditions tell that in most cases, ),,( ∗∗∗ nmb  
 oa . 
, we have not consider the fact that not 
We discuss it in
is different from 
, which means that will be different from
ess, when we sol  m and n






)  w,( ∗∗ nm
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4. Discussion of the Results 
 
As stated above in model 1, we have shown that usually the best compensation 
function under evasion case is not the same as that under no evasion case, which 
results in an effort level chosen by the manager when evasion exists depart from that 
of no evasion. Since the effort level we find in the no evasion case is the optimal 
effort level, evasion brings efficiency loss. 
Proposition 1. If the owner of a corporation determines to operate on tax evasion, 
the optimal contract has to be altered from the second-best compensation scheme and 
thus incur efficiency loss. 
We would like to explain the meaning of “efficiency loss” here.  is derived 
from solving the optimization problem under evasion, so it does maximize the 
owner’s expected utility when deciding to evade. This maximized expected utility is a 
result of an effort level exerted by the manager and the activity of evasion. 
Evasion benefits the owner in the sense that underreporting by some certain extent, 
the savings in taxes exceeds the expected penalty involved in evasion; however, by 
choosing effort level , instead of , the before-tax profit generated in the no 
evasion case can no longer be achieved , the loss of which is what we call “efficiency 
loss”. In a word, there are two opposite forces influencing the maximum expected 
utility for the owner: a change in effort level caused by evasion harms the firm while 
evasion itself benefits the firm. Therefore, the maximum expected utility under 






but she has to bear the loss in the before-tax profit level, which will not be affected in 
an individual evasion problem; or perhaps the negative effect of evasion exceeds the 
positive effect, so that the owner finds it is better to just truthfully report and orders 
the manager to do in such a way. 
This finding is similar to Chen and Chu’s conclusion, but we believe our 
assumptions are more reasonable. It is consistent with the practical data presented in 
introduction. Compared to an individual, owners of a firm will not evade tax just 
observing that the expected gain is positive. They are aware of the fact that the 
compensation schemes under evasion can no longer optimally inspire the manager, 
which results in lower before-tax profit, and the loss might overweigh the gain on tax 
evasion. Firm owners take account of two tradeoffs, risk of being caught and risk of 
losing internal efficiency, while individuals only care about the former. Therefore, a 
firm will require an expected gain high enough to offset the efficiency loss other than 
just being “positive”. Accordingly, we expect firms to be more cautious than 
individuals when attempting to evade and they should exhibit a lower underreporting 
rate. 
The same finding can be drawn in model 2 as well, since similarly, in most cases, 
the contract will not be the same under evasion and no evasion, thus leading to a 
problem of over-compensation or under-compensation, both will result in a before-tax 
profit less than maximum level, but more importantly, it shows that there is another 
source of efficiency loss in reality. 
When we state the optimization problem for evasion, it is not taken into account 
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, it is indifferent with model 1. If this condition does 
not hold, the optimal contract for evasion actually will mislead the manager to 
truthfully report or even over-report. The owner must give up the best contract, 
choosing another one that satisfies the above-stated condition so as to successfully 
induce evasion, altering from the optimal contract for evasion to which brings 
distortion in effort level and loss in before-tax profits. 
Proposition 2. If the owner of a corporation can only induce evasion, instead of 
ordering evasion, there may be additional efficiency loss. 
We set up two models, intending to separate these two sources of efficiency loss. 
One is resulted from the fact that evasion will lead to too much effort or too less effort, 
both reduces before-tax profits; the other one is that because of asymmetrical 
information, the owner has restrictions in designing the optimal contract to maximize 
her utility. Just like in a standard principal-agent model, the principal chooses a 
so-called second-best compensation scheme because effort level is private information 
of the agent; here the principal might have to choose a “third-best” compensation 
scheme because even output level is not known by her. The latter source of efficiency 
loss reinforces the former one, further reducing the probability for a firm to benefit 





We build a simple model to analyze corporate income tax evasion, based on Chen and 
Chu’s work. The basic difference between corporate income tax evasion and 
individual income tax evasion is that the former needs cooperation between the 
manager and the firm owner, while the latter one can be more easily accomplished. 
The contract between the principal and the agent will be distorted from the 
second-best, so that it affects manager’s decision on how much effort to take and thus 
affects the final output of the firm. However, for individuals or private businesses, 
there is no such incentive inducing issue, which means that the effort chosen is 
separate from evasion decision, i.e. output level will not decrease when evasion takes 
place.  
This fact helps to explain the differences in observed data. For corporations to 
evade there is one more consideration of tradeoffs than individuals, efficiency loss, 
referring to the reduction in before-tax profits. This efficiency loss reduces the 
possibility of a firm to benefit from evasion as well as the extent of benefits, therefore 
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